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1 One of the distinctive characteristics of the Kurdish movement1 in post-1980 Turkey is
the  fact  that  the  movement  has  been  successful  in  mobilizing  women  in  masses.
Women’s participation in Kurdish rebellions is not unprecedented. There were women
participants among the revolting forces in Kurdish rebellions of the late 19th and early
20th centuries.  However, these women were exceptionally low in numbers, and they
consisted mainly of wives, daughters, and relatives of the leaders of the revolts.
2 After 1980, in contrast, women participated in the Kurdish movement to such a degree
that  the  gender  composition  of  the  movement  in  general  was  seriously  affected.
Throughout the 1990s, many women went up to the mountains in order to join the
‘guerrillas.’  In  the  legal  field,  women  started  to  take  active  roles  in  civil  society
organizations  that  opposed  human  rights  violations  and  in  pro-Kurdish  political
parties.  Within  these  organizations,  women  reached  influential  positions  both  in
decision-making and in administration, and were even elected as mayors and deputies. 
3 Besides these activities, women’s success in bringing up questions regarding women’s
equality  and  injecting  these  questions  into  the  political  agenda  of  the  Kurdish
movement has led some to analyze Kurdish women’s dynamism within the context of
black feminism.2
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4 Geographically, Kurds are inhabitants of what is sometimes called the patriarchal belt3;
 similar to the neighboring peoples of the same geography, the roles and the places of
Kurdish men and women are gendered, and women are expected to limit themselves to
tasks  that  are  considered  appropriate  for  them.4 When  the  influence  of  namus5 —
defined through the surveillance of women’s bodies, behaviors, and sexualities by men
—  is  taken  into  account,  women’s  political  participation  becomes  all  the  more
noteworthy.
5 The  Kurdish  movement’s  ideological-political  discourse  is  also  worth  emphasizing.
Unlike the Kurdish nationalist discourse of the late 19thand early 20th centuries, which
included women mainly as symbols and boundary-markers in the construction of the
Kurdish identity as a different and modern identity (Klein, 2001), women’s appearance
in the public sphere and their political  mobilization plays an important role in the
ideological and political texts of the post-1980 Kurdish movement. Themes related to
women’s  equality  especially  gained  weight  in  the  late  1990s,  when  the  active
participation of women in the Kurdish movement, both as politicians and as ‘fighters,’
increased. In the same period, one also observes a change in the mythical sources that
served the construction of Kurdishness as a political identity. The myth of Kawa the
Blacksmith6, which is acknowledged as the founding myth of Kurdishness, seems to have
given way, to a considerable extent if not entirely, to a new myth in the late 1990s, the
myth  of  Ishtar  the  Goddess7,  an  important  figure  belonging  to  the  Neolithic  cult  of
goddesses. Although both myths — the myth of the Kawa the Blacksmith and the myth
of  the  Ishtar  the  Goddess  —  emphasize  historical  continuity  from  the  prehistoric
peoples of Mesopotamia and the Neolithic rural revolution until  today, and thereby
allow the  construction of  a  continuous  identity  of  Kurdishness,  the  new myth also
breaks with the older one by emphasizing a historical period and structure in which
women were active.
6 It is possible to evaluate these two myths in the context of the cultural decolonization
processes  observed  by  Chatterjee  (1993)  in  anti-colonial  struggles.  According  to
Chatterjee, these types of mythic fictions are closely related to political programs of the
present, and involve an increasing sense of empowerment, as well as the developing
trajectories  of  emancipation and independence.  Nira  Yuval-Davis  (2003:  120)  argues
that  the  redefinition  and  reconstruction  of  gender  relations,  of  which  the  shift  in
gender fictions from the former myth to the latter is a striking illustration, is of central
importance  within  cultural  decolonization  processes.  For  Kandiyoti  (1997:  151-152),
however, nationalist projects present themselves simultaneously as a modern project
that can transform traditional relations in favor of new identities, and as a resurrection
of values belonging to a pure culture, rising from the depths of a shared social past;
these projects, therefore, open up highly fluid and indeterminate meanings, which can
be  resurrected  and  reinterpreted  at  critical  points  in  nation-state  histories.  Such
meanings appear as a result of conflicts between political actors and their struggles,
and thus profoundly affect definitions concerning who and what constitutes the nation,
claims of national unity and alternative claims to sovereignty, and last but not least,
conceptions about gender relations.
7 These subject matters make the Kurdish movement worth examining with regard to
the mutual interaction between the national fictions and gender relations. This article
aims  to  examine  the  Kurdish  movement’s  ideological  discourse  from  a  gender
perspective. The article argues that there is a mutual interaction between the Kurdish
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movement’s ideological discourse and the fact that women have been active political
participants both as politicians and as ‘fighters.’ Furthermore, it is implied that this
interaction has had a transformative effect on the way in which gender is constructed
within  the  new Kurdish  identity.  It  is  claimed  that  the  symbolic  transformation
concerning gender in the construction of Kurdish identity, which can be termed from
Kawa the Blacksmith to Ishtar the Goddess, has limited and contradictory effects when seen
from the perspective of the real lives of women.
8 The  main  theoretical  ground  for  the  analysis  consists  of  feminist  studies  that
demonstrate  that  national  fictions  and  projects  are  gendered  in  nature,  and  that
nationalism and gender are mutually co-constructive.  In analyzing the new Kurdish
identity  from  a  gender  perspective,  we  depart  from  Stuart  Hall’s  evaluation  that
identities are social constructs (quoted in Stephen 2005: 66).
9 The majority of the primary sources consist of texts by the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.
This is because the determining power in the post-1980 Kurdish movement in Turkey
has  been  the  PKK,  the  Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  (Partiya  Karkeren
Kurdistan)  founded  in  1978,  and  the  majority  of  the  ideological  texts  of  this  Party
consists of Öcalan’s talks, seminars, and statements known as analyses (çözümlemeler).8
10 Although there are no strict restrictions concerning the texts to be analyzed, most of
the texts belong to a particular time period, extending specifically from the 1980s to
the  1990s.  The  selected  time  period  is  meaningful  in  that  it  allows  a  comparison
between the texts of the 1980s, when the focus was to remove the barriers stopping
women from participating, and the texts of the 1990s, produced after women started
actively participating. 
11 Although the perceptions and experiences of the women who have participated in the
Kurdish movement could help discover the practical possibilities and the limits of the
new definition of Kurdish identity, a definition that symbolically assigns a constitutive
mission  to  women,  the  analysis  in  this  article  is  limited  to  an  examination  of  the
ideological  discourse  of  the  movement.9In  probing  the  Kurdish  movement  from  a
gender perspective, and in analyzing transformations that the movement underwent,
the author alsobenefits from her own personal observations.
 
1. National Fictions and Gender
12 One of the common characteristics of ethnic and nationalist ideologies and movements
is the fact that they depend on the constitution of myths that are forged around a
particular  collective  identity.  Although  nationalist  ideologies  preach  the
omnitemporality of nations, nationalism studies in the last quarter of the 20th century
have significantly altered our notions of nations,  by showing that both nations and
nationalism are modern phenomena dating back two centuries at most (Anderson 1991;
Hobsbawm 1990; Gellner 1998). These studies have showed that nations in the modern
sense  are  ‘imagined  communities’  and  that  most  nations  and  nationalisms  are
constructed retrospectively, after the establishment of nation-states, through ‘invented
traditions.’
13 Feminist  researchers  have  made significant  contributions  to  nationalism studies  by
demonstrating  that  gender,  the  roles  and  meanings  assigned  to  womanhood  and
manhood, plays a constitutive role in the construction of nationalist fictions. Studies
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that identify nationalism as an open field where different loci of power compete not
only provided visibility to women within nationalist practices, but also demonstrated
that gender is at the heart of nationalist fictions and projects.
14 An  important  reference  for  these  studies,  which  show  that  nationalism  and
modernization  projects  are  intertwined  in  post-colonial  societies,  are  the  works  of
Kumari Jayawardena, who analyzes the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggles, and the
process  of  nation-state  building  in  Asia  in  late  19th and  early  20 th centuries.
Jayawardena (1986) argues that in the countries she examined, feminism went hand in
hand with anti-colonial pro-reform nationalist movements. According to Jayawardena,
reformers believed that it was necessary to modernize society through internal reforms
if they were to succeed in anti-imperialist struggles; therefore, they tried to eliminate
pre-capitalist  structures,  especially  the  ruling  dynasties  and  religious  bigotry.  This
brought up the question of women taking part in the public sphere as equal citizens,
and  created  the  context  in  which  feminism  emerged  (ibid.:  3).  Jayawardena  draws
attention to the fact that in addition to modernization attempts, women’s stepping out
of homes is also related to the capitalist demand for cheap labor force (ibid.: 256), and
shows  that  reform  periods  in  most  countries  coincide  with  attempts  at  capitalist
development, when women’s cheap labor power began to be used both for production
in factories and in the service sector.
15 On the other hand, the movements’ need to emphasize national identity for mobilizing
their societies against colonization brought women and womanhood into the agenda in
a  different  context.  While  reforms  envisaged  women  as  modern,  the  emphasis  on
national identity also required women to be bearers and sustainers of the ‘national
culture.’  As  Jayawardena  puts  it,  women  were  expected  to  be  both  ‘modern’  and
‘traditional’ simultaneously (1986: 14). Although the effects of the reforms were limited
due to this contradiction, they generally had positive results for women; however, a
common characteristic of all the countries Jayawardena examines is the fact that the
question of the ‘new woman’ remained at the heart of discussions concerning the new
society and the new configurations of power.
16 As Jayawardena also points out, women started to occupy an important place within
the agenda of pro-reform nationalist movements from the early 20th century onwards.
Change and progress were the fundamental tenets of the period, and the discussions
about how the ‘new woman’ should appear within this change—a change which was
understood as  a  transition from ‘traditional’  to  ‘modern’—remained at  the heart  of
discussions. Qasim Amin’s book The New Woman, published in Egypt in 1901, gave voice
to these concerns.
17 Feminist  researchers  who  are  suspicious  towards  this  ‘new  woman’  and  ‘women’s
liberation’ agendas of the period argue that this agenda was not for women but for
men, that it was about the male bourgeois reformers and their imaginations of modern
society  and modern family,  subjecting women to  new forms of  patriarchal  control.
Kandiyoti (1997: 152), for instance, emphasizes that similar to the western colonizers,
who  used  the  ill  fortunes  of  eastern  women  as  signifiers  of  the  barbarism  and
backwardness of colonized peoples, thereby declaring their own civilizations superior
and legitimizing their sovereignty, modernist reformers, too, lamented the women’s
situation, seeing it as a sign of backwardness.
18 According to Nira Yuval-Davis (2003: 120), another researcher who is wary of the effects
of these movements on women’s positions, ‘women’s liberation’ is one of the important
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mechanisms for signifying both internal and external actions of ethnic and national
projects towards modernization. Narratives of identity constitute the main instruments
of the ethnic projects, while gender relations and sexuality play a crucial role in the
cultural constitution of difference. In Gender, Nation, State (1989), Yuval-Davis and Floya
Anthias demonstrate the different duties and missions that are assigned to women in
this  context.  In  so  doing,  nationalist  projects  and  constructions  see  women  as
reproducers of the ethnic/national community, both biologically and culturally. Their
duty as reproducers paves the way for the control over women’s bodies, fertilities, and
behaviors in the name of the nation. Women’s clothing and behaviors are bestowed
critical  significance  in  drawing  the  cultural  boundaries  of  the  ethnic-national
communities,  or  to  put  it  differently,  in  the  self-constitution  of  communities  as
different and distinct from their counterparts. It is assumed that women are signifiers
and carriers of the authentic ‘essence’ of the nation. This is another serious burden of
representation for women. Women, then, are expected to behave appropriately, in line
with this essence. Women who sacrificially perform this national duty are sublimated,
while  those  women  who  cross  the  boundaries  are  excluded.  Besides  these  rather
cultural  and  symbolic  duties,  women are  active  participants  in  national,  economic,
political, and military struggles (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989: 1-14). 
19 Agreeing with the argument that national identity politics are waged over women’s
bodies, Deniz Kandiyoti states that for the same reason, women’s place in nationalist
state politics also carries with it indeterminacies and contradictions. While the pro-
modernization elements in nationalist projects invite women to take part in the public
sphere as  equal  citizens,  women are also  assigned the duty of  being carriers  of  an
untainted national culture, and the hazards of the ‘modern’ are sought within their
changing  behaviors.  The  latter,  however,  invalidates  women’s  equal  citizenship
(Kandiyoti 1997: 14-15).
20 The  sources  of the  problem  concerning  women’s  citizenship  have  been  widely
elaborated  beyond  nationalism  studies  and  feminist  theory  and  research.  Carol
Pateman  (1998),  who  sought  the  problem’s  source  in  contract  theories and  in  the
distinction between the private and public spheres—one of the fundamental bases of
bourgeois-liberal political thought—states that the social contract, which is assumed to
have  taken  place  among  equal  citizens  in  the  public  sphere,  renders  invisible  the
unequal contract between men and women in the private sphere. For Pateman, the
social  contract,  which  expresses  the  transition  from  the  traditional  world  to  the
modern world,  is  a contract among brothers which replaces the traditional form of
patriarchy based on the power of the father with a form of patriarchy based on the
power of the brothers. Similar to Pateman, Sylvia Walby (1992) points out that a shift in
patriarchy takes places with modernization from the private form of patriarchy where
women are controlled at home to a public form of patriarchy.
21 It  is  possible  to  consider  the  conflicting  articulation  of  women  in  nationalist
movements in the context of nationalist movements’ contradictory attitudes towards
women and different forms of patriarchy. Partha Chatterjee (2000: 107) states that the
anti-colonial  nationalism  in  India  tried  to  overcome  such  contradictions  by
constituting dichotomies such as spiritual versus material, home versus world, woman
versus man. Since the material world outside was the world of the colonizer and of
homogenizations, the place to conserve difference was the spiritual world and home.
Women had to be the protectors and sustainers of this spiritual world, and at the same
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time,  they  were  prohibited  from  crossing  the  ‘new  patriarchal’  boundaries  when
stepping into the public sphere as necessitated by modernization. This new patriarchy
assigned women a duty to endorse new social responsibilities, and relegated ‘women’s
liberation’  and women to  secondary status,  a  status  which was  new and legitimate
(ibid.: 113). 
22 Jayawardena’s observation (1986: 14) points to the same contradiction when she states
that nationalist reformers sought non-western indigenous support for women’s equal
status.  In  most  of  the  Asian  countries  she  examines,  reformers  reasoned  that  the
present unequal social status of women was due to ‘external’ influence, and put forth
the idea that women were ‘essentially’ more equal and free in their national culture. So
while stressing a golden age, a distant past filled with the nation’s ‘cultural essence,’
sources from within this culture are used to legitimate the equal status of women.
23 However, while women benefited from reforms, the accompanying dichotomies such as
modern  versus  traditional,  home  versus  public  sphere,  and  woman  versus  man
burdened women with invisible costs to be paid besides what women benefited from
reforms,  since  reforms  took  place  in  company  with  dualities  like modern  and  the
traditional, or dichotomies like home versus public sphere, woman versus man. Post-
colonial feminist researcher Abu-Lughod therefore questions the traditional/modern
dichotomy  and  proposes  that  we  be  skeptical  about  the  association  of  women’s
liberation with modernization, and that we draws attention to the invisible costs of
modernity  on women,  and proposes  to  determine  what  these  costs  were.  It  is  this
problem that is traced in Remaking Women (1998), a book consisting of articles about the
relationship between feminism, modernization and post-colonialism in the Middle East,
scrutinizing once again the fundamental figures and institutions of the narrative on
women’s  progress.  In  Remaking  Women (Abu-Lughod  1998),  she  reveals  the
contradictions  of  bourgeois  reform  programs,  which  were  related  to  the  rational-
scientific forms of government aiming to make women modern, especially with regard
to education, marriage and raising children. At the same time she deciphers new forms
of discipline and regulations brought about by the same reform programs. Supporting
Kandiyoti’s (1987) ‘emancipated but unliberated’ formulation, Abu-Lughod (1998: 256)
argues that  a  new understanding of  discipline accompanied the women’s  liberation
movements. For her, bourgeois reformers’ concerns, such as women’s education, love
marriages, and scientific child rearing, were closely related to this new understanding
of  discipline.  Similarly,  Sirman  (2002:  233)  argues  that  the  ‘new  family’  and  ‘new
woman’  were  not  only  categories  determined  by  new  forms  of  power,  but  were
structures  that  created  power,  helped power  make sense,  and enabled  a  particular
configuration of power relations to take effect.
24 One of the consequences of the fact that national fictions and projects are accompanied
by discourses on womanhood and family and of the fact that the new discourse on
family is  actually a new disciplinary mechanism for regulating society is  that these
discourses are simultaneously about love and affection. Sirman (2002), in analyzing the
role of literature in the construction of Turkish national identity after the Tanzimat era
and the founding of the Republic, demonstrates that love and affection occupy a central
place in  the transition from the empire,  where the Sultan represented the father’s
authority over the whole society, to the founding of nation-state power. Referring to
Abu-Lughod’s  research  on  Berbers  in  Egypt,  Sirman  argues  that  to  define  love  or
affection  is  to  socially  define  the  subject’s  emotions.  Through  this  definition,  the
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subject is constituted as a whole and equipped with emotions. Love creates the subject
by equipping her first with desires, and then with the duty to curb her desires. When
seen in this perspective, the process of defining the concept of love can also be read as
a process of defining the relations between sexes, sexuality, and subjectivity. Such a
reading shows us that the process of curbing desire takes place on the axis of nation-
family (Sirman 2002: 240).
25 Including desires and sexuality in the field of discussions about nationalism and gender
is  an  occasion  for  reflecting  on  Anderson’s  (1991:  5)  question  of  how  nationalism
successfully calls on people to die for the sake of the nation. Frantz Fanon (1965), who
examines the psychological effects of colonizers on the colonized societies,  asserted
that  the  colonizers  rendered  the  colonized  men  impotent  and  described  the  anti-
colonial  wars  in  terms  of  colonized  men  reclaiming  their  manhood.  Cynthia  Enloe
similarly  states  that  ‘nationalism  has  typically  sprung  from  masculinized  memory,
masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope’ (2003: 79).  The identification of the
home land with the female body, imagined in many examples as a mother in tears, or as
a lover wailing under the occupation of enemy men, is deeply effective for mobilizing
men to die for the homeland. The statement ‘vatan borcu namus borcudur’ (indebted to
the homeland, indebted to namus), which identifies the homeland with the female body
and codifies the duty to guard the homeland as a namus debt for the nation’s men,
could  be  read  as  an  expression  of  such  masculine  imagination.  Afsaneh Najmabadi
(1997)  identifies  a  similar  analogy  in  the  discourse  of  Iranian  nationalism.
Demonstrating that the discourse constructs the homeland as a female body through
articulations between classical literature on love on the one hand and patriotic poetry
on  the  other,  Najmabadi  indicates  that  this  construction  serves  to  formulate
womanhood as a body in need of protection against foreign ambitions, harassment, and
rape,  thereby  assigning  nationalism  the  duty  as  the  gatekeepers  of  namus.  The
construction  of  the  homeland  and  its  women  as  bodies  in  need  of  protection  and
possession by the nation’s men has deepened the difference and inequality between
male and female citizens.
26 Despite  these critical observations  of  the contradictory articulations  of  women and
nationalist movements one need not overlook the potentials residing in women’s active
participation. Although it is men who set the stage and write the scenarios, this does
not necessarily mean that women are doomed to remain wholly passive elements in
nationalist processes. As Chatterjee (2002) points out in her examination of the anti-
colonial  nationalism  in  India,  women  were  active  participants  in  the  processes  of
nation-state building even when their voices were not heard, and even if women found
themselves subjected to a new patriarchal order. That only men’s voices were heard
doesn’t necessarily mean that there were no other voices.
27 Moreover, ethnic and national identities are collective constructs, just like any other
collective identity. They never exhibit homogeneous, fixed qualities. Actors’ struggles
have  the  potential  to  change  the  content  of  these  identities.  Such  potentials  are
especially  present when women are not merely symbols  of  the ethnic and national
fictions and projects, but are actors themselves.
28 Finally,  it  is  important  to  take  into  account  that  nationalism  is  a  field  open to
competition  among  different  loci  of  power  (Sirman  2002:  230),  that  class  relations
cannot  be  overlooked when analyzing the interaction between gender  and projects
based  on  national  fictions,  and  that  conflicts  between  ethnic  and  national  groups
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include  various  other  conflicts  between  social  hierarchies  (Walby  2000:  31).  The
nationalist modernization projects analyzed in the aforementioned studies appeared,
for the most part, as the struggles of local bourgeoisies aiming to establish their own
domination  against  colonial  power.  As  Walby  highlights  (ibid.:  34),  even  the  most
integrated ethnic/national group always harbors a system of social inequality in which
the  dominant  group(s)  establish  their  hegemony  over  the  political  project  of  the
‘community’ or its ‘culture.’ Therefore, it should be expected that different members of
the group have different interests in the ethnic/national conflicts. Thus, parallel to the
transformations within a particular nationalist movement, the movement’s discourse
on gender could also change.
 
2. The Post-1980 Kurdish Movement and the Factors
behind the Discourse of Gender Equality
2.1. Conditions of emergence 
29 The  Kurdish  rebellions  of  the  early  20th century  were  mostly  lead  by  Kurdish
sovereigns, and were carried out through tribal relations, religious symbols playing an
important  role  as  mobilizing  mechanisms  (Olson  1989;  Jwaideh  2006).  The  Kurdish
movement that emerged in the last quarter of the 20th century, however, was different
in that it emerged from within the impoverished parts of society that had undergone a
process  of  proletarianization  (McDowall  1997).  Behind  this  change  lay  factors  like
modernization and the development of capitalism in Turkey, which also transformed
the socioeconomic structure of Kurdish society.
30 After the suppression of the rebellions of the late 19th and early 20 th centuries,  the
Kurdish sovereigns, the spokesmen of the Kurdish opposition, were eliminated by the
Turkish state. As David McDowall (1997) also emphasizes, the loyalty of the rest of the
Kurdish  elites  was  won  through  granting  them  various  economic  and  political
privileges. As a result, the Kurdish elites were removed from the Kurdish opposition’s
political  field.  The patronage relations that the state forged with the Kurdish elites
made the state stronger while deepening poverty and class difference among Kurds.
This, in turn, paved the way for the emergence of a new Kurdish opposition. From the
1950s  onwards,  with  the  capitalist  development  of  agriculture  in  Turkey,  landless
peasants and agricultural  workers were increasingly poor and separated from their
lands. Peasants started thinking that the state and the local elites were the source of
their poverty and the political pressure they experienced, and thus felt anger towards
both parties.
31 When impoverished Kurdish youths who emigrated to the big cities to work or study
encountered the left-wing youth movements, their anger was transformed into a left-
leaning  Kurdish  opposition  against  both  local  elites  and  the  state  (Beşikçi  1992;
Bruinessen 1992a). The role of the Turkish Labor Party (TİP) in this process cannot be
overlooked. Besides pointing to the rural inequalities and the poverty of Kurds, the TİP
also  emphasized  the  oppression  of  Kurdish  language  and  identity,  arousing  huge
interest among the Kurds in a short period of time. The organizational activities of the
TİP among Kurds were crucial in helping the impoverished Kurds consider themselves
a  potential  political  power  (Ekinci  2001:  94-116).  This  was  their  primary  political
socialization, before they established separate political groups. 
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32 The  Kurdish  youth  clustered  in  the  big  cities  of  Turkey  did  not  form  separate
organizations at first. However, the military coup d’état on March 12th 1971 shut down
TİP, dealing a big blow to the left-wing youth organizations and leading them to go
underground, where they became more radical and conducted armed actions. In the
late 1970s radicalized Kurdish groups started forming their  own organizations with
demands  such  as  independence.  One  of  these  Kurdish  organizations  was  the  PKK,
established in 1978 with the purpose of founding an independent socialist state. While
the  military  coup  d’état  of  September  12th 1980  crushed  most  of  the  radical
organizations, the PKK managed to survive, and became, after September 12th, one of
the important actors to take up the political agenda of Turkey’s Kurds.
 
2.2. The political aims of the new Kurdish Movement 
33 These socioeconomic changes in Turkey’s Kurdish society did not only alter the class
character of the Kurdish opposition, they also determined its ideological and political
aims  and  mobilization  strategies.  Similar  to  the  examples  that  Jayawardena  (1986)
examines,  the  new leftist,  secular  Kurdish  movement  foresaw a  political  project  of
internal reforms aiming to modernize Kurdish society for the purposes of struggling
against the ‘colonizer’; thus, the movement followed the modern/traditional dualism.
The movement targeted both the Kurdish sovereign elites and the state, defining the
latter as ‘colonizers,’ the former as ‘comprador and feudal powers.’ Parti Programı (Party
Program), which was published by the PKK in 1978, clearly indicated that the national
project  of  the  movement  did  not  include  all  Kurds.  According  to  this  program,  a
‘national democratic revolution’ was to be realized under the leadership of the working
class  through  an  alliance  between  workers  and  peasants.  Under  the  banner  of
proletarian  internationalism,  proletarian  classes  of  the  neighboring  peoples  and
socialist  states  were  allies  of  top  priority,  while  large  landowners  and  other  local
sovereigns  were  held  responsible.  The  ‘national’  aspect  of  the  national  democratic
revolution targeted the ‘colonial system,’ while the ‘democratic’ aspect targeted what
was called the ‘feudal comprador exploitation,’ characterizing the kinship-based tribal
structures and religious community relations as ‘remainders of the Middle Ages’ and
therefore as barriers to the realization of social equality (quoted by İsmet 1993: 55-56).
The unequal position of women was brought up in this context.
 
2.3. Mobilization strategies
34 Besides the ideological framework, the mobilization strategies of the movement also
played a determining role in treating gender inequality as a problem to be resolved.
The  PKK’s  ‘strategy  of  long-term people’s  war’  also  placed  women’s  secondary  and
dependent position on the agenda as a practical problem. ‘People’s war’ necessitated
both the support and active participation of women. However, it was not very easy to
mobilize women in the Kurdish society, where patriarchal attachments binding women
were abundant. In addition, married men who saw their wives as their namus hesitated
to abandon their wives and join the movement. For the mobilization strategy to be
successful, therefore, the patriarchal barriers that tightly controlled and locked women
at home had to be removed, and namus, defined as the control over women’s sexuality,
could no longer be an impediment.
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35 This difficulty was especially felt in the rural areas in which the movement tried to find
support  in  1980s.  It  is  in  these years  that  Öcalan’s  ‘analyses’  increasingly criticized
traditional patriarchal family structures, women’s secondary status within the family,
and the gender roles that associated women with namus and assigned men the duty to
protect it. These critiques were later published with the title Woman and Family Question
(Öcalan  1992a),  and  since  they  were  circulated  widely,  they  can  be  regarded  as  a
fundamental source for our subject.10
36 In the Woman and Family Question, Öcalan articulates the critique of gender inequality
and more generally of  the family structures in which women are tightly controlled
together with the critique of Kurdish sovereign classes. The use of definitions like ‘old
family’  and ‘old  Kurdishness’  is  a  conscious  choice.  For  in  this  articulation,  Öcalan
argues that the patriarchal family structure and the inequalities it involves are in the
interest of Kurdish sovereign classes, and that they are reproduced by them. In the
book, it is stated that the Kurdish sovereign classes collaborate with the state, and do
not allow the Kurds to become independent modern individuals by enforcing tribal
relations, thereby hampering their social development.
37 Like the examples given in the first part, the analyses in the Woman and Family Question
are about the modernization of the family and the emergence of the modern individual;
they claim that the kinship-based tribal structures and the family structure are barriers
for  both  individualization  and  the  development  of  national  sentiments  and
attachments. According to the analyses in the book, Kurds’ horizon was limited to the
patriarchal family because they were socially, politically, and economically oppressed
as  a  result  of  an alliance between the ‘colonizer’  state  and the comprador Kurdish
sovereign classes. What should be done, then, was to get rid of familial attachments.
Thus, in the Woman and Family Question, there are repeated calls to abandon the family.
As will be seen later, it was claimed that this was the only way to create ‘new (and free)
Kurdishness.’
38 One of  the fundamental  conditions for  men and women to get  rid of  their  familial
attachments was to eliminate the namus barrier.  Concomitantly,  at the heart of the
critique of family was the critique of the relations between men and women in which
the men’s namus hinges on women’s body and sexuality:
Since sexual motives are fundamental instincts, the problems thus created lead to
profound  political  perversions.  To  resolve  the  sexual  motives  is  to  realize  the
greatest  revolution.  There  is  no  one  among  us  who  has  not  yet  realized  this.
Everyone  succumbs.  Kurdish  society  expresses  an  individual  type  and  a  social
reality, which succumbs, more than any other society in the world, to instincts of
hunger and sexuality. [...] Around these sexual motives are formed a certain namus,
a  certain  understanding  of  morality,  and  no  brave  fellows  have  the  power  to
overcome  this.  [...]  In  this  bottleneck,  our  individual  has  lost  once  again,  even
before it reached the age of twenty. (Öcalan 1999: 19)
39 The analyses state that the family structure locks up women in the house, renders her
dependent  on  men,  makes  a  fetish  of  namus,  and  pulls  women  down.11 Loving  and
marrying such women is a trap for men because women will not hesitate to use their
state of being-pulled-down as a means to pull down men. As will be seen in the example
below, the idea that the more women are pulled down they will pull men down as well,
served, above all, to keep male militants away from women and familial attachments.
Woman is like a slave, weak, and too unequipped and dangerous. [...] That is, she
craftily uses her own state of being-pulled-down in order to pull down the whole
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society. These are questions that we need to be careful about when we go into the
process of national liberation. [...] The reason why most of you are inadequately
revolutionized is the relationships that you established with the woman reality. The
fundamental measures of resistance or the fundamental measures of socialism are
left  aside  in  the  process  of  developing  emotions;  instead,  relationships  were
developed, which can lead to slavery. Don’t you know that a relationship with a
woman, into which you were plotted, is a trap? The enemy uses this so well. (Öcalan
1992a: 106)
40 The analyses also characterize women as ‘slaves of slaves,’ stating that women as a sex
are subject to a second-degree enslavement in Kurdish society, which is itself enslaved
by  external  powers  and  their  local  compradors.  In  addition  to  evaluating  women’s
condition,  such  characterizations  also  served  a  function  in  the  PKK’s  mobilization
strategies. It was expected that by removing the barriers which keep women home and
thereby  liberating  women  from  servitude,  women  would  leave  home  to  join  the
Kurdish movement and would play an important role in the dissolution of the wider
condition of servitude in which Kurds were trapped.
Women’s  liberation  is  Kurdistan’s  liberation;  it  is  even  the  men’s  liberation.  It
seems to me that men’s relation to women is similar to that of an occupier. … The
level of women’s freedom is also the level of society’s freedom; that, in turn, is the
country’s freedom. (Öcalan 1999: 27)
41 In the first analysis quoted above, men are asked to keep away from women, while the
second analysis brings up the question of women being liberated. As will be seen below,
it was suggested, in this way, that men should relate to women not on the basis of
marriage and love, but on the basis of ‘liberating women.’
 
2.4. The discourse of ‘liberating women’ in the 1980s
Millions of women are left on their own (sahipsiz), are in a deadly situation, bound
with  innumerable  bonds  of  servitude.  Shatter  those  bonds,  liberate  women,  let
women become a flood and fall like a waterfall. In our society, women are killed.
The first thing for you to do is to find the bonds that bind women, and slash them.
(Öcalan 1992a: 101-102)
42 The quote above can be evaluated as an expression of the fact that efforts to mobilize
society had as their  primary aim the ‘liberation’  of  women and the slashing of  the
bonds  binding  women.  It  was  thought  that  the  multiple  oppressions  women  were
exposed to would make women more sensible and easier to mobilize. Also, as can be
seen in the quote below, it was anticipated that women could be effective in improving
public relations.
It can be said that women experience the extremes of all forms of oppression and
exploitation. [...] Women are a ground that can be greatly developed in the future, a
ground on which the National Liberation Struggle could depend, in the condition
that they are treated and organized. (Öcalan 1992a: 52-53) (italics my emphasis)
43 Another  expectation  that  played  a  role  in  mobilizing  women  was  concerned  with
creating a public opinion. The interest aroused by the Palestinian intifada in the global
public  opinion,  in  particular,  strikingly  showed  the  role  that  women  can  play  in
demonstrations:
Today, during the Palestinian uprising, it is almost entirely women, children, and
the youth with stones who carry out the revolution. There are lessons to take from
this. [...] When women, who make up half of the society, take to the streets, it is
impossible to control them [...]. In this respect, especially for improving the urban
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movement, we must take action in this next stage. [...]  Certainly, all  women are
furious. All of them are hungry and impoverished. It is possible to make them into
rebels by using all kinds of methods. (Öcalan 1992a: 101-102, 253)
44 It is clear that this discourse, in which the women are defined as instruments and as a
ground, is an expression of an instrumental approach towards ‘women’s liberation’ in
line  with  the  mobilization strategy.  On the  other  hand,  it  also  verifies  Chatterjee’s
(2000)  observation  that  women do  not  speak  within  nationalist  discourses,  but  are
spoken about. The language that is used here codifies the man as both the addressor
and the addressee. Woman is the object of speech. In the next section, we will evaluate
the  effects  that  the  change  in  the  gender  composition  of  movement  had  on  this
language,  in  particular  the  entrance  of  women  into  dialogue  as  actors.  But  before
discussing this, it is useful to turn to the question of how namus,  one of the biggest
barriers to women’s participation in the movement as actors, was eliminated through a
discursive operation.
 
2.5. The redefinition of namus: from the female body to the
homeland as a whole
45 As  indicated  above,  the  critique  of  what  Öcalan  characterizes  as  the  ‘old  family’
involves at the same time a redefinition of namus, which used to be defined through the
female body. This critique was mainly concerned with redefining namus by shifting the
fields of signification. Analyses of namus pointed to a new field on which it was to be
defined:
Men seek  complete  dominion in  sexuality.  [...]  Women,  on  the  other  hand,  use
sexuality  as  their  greatest  weapon  for  keeping  hold  of  men.  [...]  This  is  where
sexuality  leads  to  a  dangerous  notion  of  namus –  [...]  and  since  this  is  our
fundamental moral norm, it  has very dangerous consequences.  The homeland is
under occupation, the homeland is raped thousands of times, but nothing is done in
return; not even a single sentiment of namus or honor. (Öcalan 1992a: 136-137)
46 Öcalan here points out to men that ‘homeland’ is the primary field within which namus
and honor are to be protected. However, at the same time he emphasizes that seeing
namus as the control over the female body and sexuality has ‘dangerous consequences’;
that this notion leads to insensitivity in the face of ‘homeland being raped.’ That is, in
addition to pointing to the new and privileged field of signification, Öcalan highlights
that focusing on the old definition,  on controlling the female body,  prevents Kurds
from fulfilling their responsibilities for the privileged field. In this way, the shift in
namus’s field of signification from the female body to the homeland calls men to fight
‘for the homeland’ in order to protect their namus and honor and, at the same time,
serves to remove the namus barrier preventing women’s participation in the same fight.
47 It is certainly true that a relationship of identity is forged here between the female
body  and  the  ‘homeland,’  a  relationship  which,  as  Najmabadi  (1997)  remarks,  is
inherent in nationalism. In this sense, one can argue that women are codified as objects
in need of protection, and that this serves to reproduce the patriarchal control over
women.  However,  one must  not  overlook the importance of  this  shift  in  signifying
namus, especially with regard to women’s freedom of movement, for it enabled women
to leave home. And it is worth remembering that women leaving home might have
unforeseeable consequences.
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3. Women’s Participation in 1990s and the Effects of
this Participation on the Kurdish Movement’s
Discourse
3.1. Women’s participation
48 The efforts of the Kurdish movement to remove patriarchal barriers locking women at
home produced results by the end of 1980s. Women started appearing in meetings and
at  street  demonstrations  in  which  political  demands  of  Kurds  were  articulated.  In
addition  to  the  ideological  propaganda  of  the  Kurdish  movement,  extraordinary
oppression by the security forces, destruction and evacuation of villages, human rights
violations,  detentions  and  arrests  were  also  effective  in  prompting  women  to  join
political demonstrations (Çağlayan 2007).
49 The movement’s Kurdish identity-based politicization and the conflict in the region
eventually reached the scope of a civil  conflict,  killing thousands and causing more
than  a  million  Kurds  to  leave  their  villages  and  immigrate  to  big  cities;  as  a
consequence, in the beginning of 1990s, there appeared extended mass demonstrations
called serhildan12, named after the Palestinian intifada.
50 The Newroz celebrations of 1990, 1991, and 1992 are of crucial importance in that they
exposed  people  to  direct  confrontation  with  the  security  forces.  For  the  Kurdish
movement  these  demonstrations,  in  which  women  participated  and  made  their
presence felt en masse, were occasions to make its presence and strength felt. Women’s
participation  had  repercussions  in  the  public  opinion.  The  harsh  responses  by  the
security forces and the death of many demonstrators as a result of gunfire led to new
demonstrations, and to more civilian deaths, including those of women.13 Even if there
was  no  more  violence  and  tension  in  the  following  years’  demonstrations,  Newroz
activities kept being an important field with regards to the political visibility of women.
51 Yet women’s participation was not limited to such street demonstrations and Newroz
activities. In the beginning of 1990s, many women from the villages and from among
the university students in big cities went up to the mountains to become ‘fighters,’ to
join the armed forces of the movement. Women’s participation reached such a scope
that it effected the overall gender composition of the movement’s militants. It has been
said that one third of the militants were women in these years (Özcan 1999).
52 Women’s presence in the harsh condition of the mountains, generally believed to fit
men better than women, was limited neither to ‘rear guard support’ nor to auxiliary
positions. Once again, women took part in what was thought to be appropriate only for
men. As Lale Yalçın Heckman and P. Van Gelder (2000: 313-318) also observe, in these
years, women guerrillas in the mountains were the most popular images circulated in
order to call Kurds to join the movement. The fact that young women died in armed
confrontations  was  also  an  emotional  factor  for  politically  mobilizing  society.  Epic
songs about young women who either died in armed clashes or were famous for their
political efforts became popular among the people.
53 It  can  be  argued  that  the  extensive  two-month-long  clashes  in  1992,  named  the
‘Southern  War’  in  the  movement’s  terminology,  was  influential  in  that  women
combated for the ‘homeland’ side by side with men, proving themselves in the field.14
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54 Women militants  and  sympathizers  described  the  purpose  of  their  participation  in
Newroz demonstrations in the early 1990s as ‘protesting the oppression of Kurds,’ and
attracted public attention through suicide protests in which they set fire to themselves.
The  suicides  implied  a  call  to  ‘sacrifice  oneself  for  freedom’  which  referred  to  the
Newroz bonfire flaring for freedom in the myth of Kawa the Blacksmith. In fact, women
were not the first to commit suicides during Newroz. One of the founders of the PKK,
Mazlum Doğan,  committed suicide in order to protest  the oppression in Diyarbakır
Prison No.  5  following the military coup d’état  on September 12;  Doğan also chose
Newroz, March 21st, as the date for his suicide. The day he had chosen was associated
with the myth of the Kawa the Blacksmith, the constitutive myth of Kurdishness, and
Mazlum  Doğan  was  consequently  declared  the  ‘Modern  Kawa.’15 In  this  way,  the
importance of the myth of Kawa the Blacksmith for the political constitution of Kurdish
identity  was  solidified once more,  allowing the movement to  establish itself  as  the
contemporary  representative  of  the  Kurdish  struggle  from  the  ancient  past  to  the
present and to make calls for self-sacrifice. The women who set themselves on fire in
the 1990s were responding to this call. 
55 A suicide protest carried out in 1995 by a woman militant with the code name Zilan was
a turning point in terms of both its style and its consequences. It was different in terms
of style because Zilan’s operation was not limited to annihilating herself, but lead to the
death of numerous soldiers; it was different in terms of its consequences because it
became  the  origin  for  the  invention of  a  new  constitutive  myth,  which  was  very
different than the myth of Kawa: The new myth assigned the liberators’  mission to
women.
56 Women’s  increased  visibility  in  various  fields  of  the  Kurdish  movement  was  also
reflected in the political parties based on Kurdish identity that were established legally.
Leyla Zana was the first popular example of a woman participating in this field, but
many others were nominated and elected in local and national elections. Pro-Kurdish
parties had the largest  number of  nominated and elected women both in local  and
parliamentary  elections.16 As  Metin  Yüksel  (2006)  emphasizes,  they  were  able  to
articulate their demands simultaneously as Kurds and as women.
 
3.2. The effects of women’s participation and the discourse of ‘the
woman who liberates herself while also liberating society’
57 Women’s extensive participation in demonstrations affected the Kurdish movement’s
ideological and political discourse. Even if the addressor of the discourse remained the
same,17 the addressee was no longer limited to male militants like it had been in the
1980s. It was not only men who fought for the ‘homeland’ and lost their lives; now
there  were  also  women  among  the  guerillas,  in  numbers  that  could  no  longer  be
underestimated. This situation factually invalidated the earlier discourse, which had
reduced women to objects waiting to be liberated.18 Parallel to this, starting from the
mid-1990s, especially after the Southern War19 in 1992, one observes that the image of
the ‘pulling-down woman’ was substituted, to a large extent, with the image of the ‘
trustworthy woman.’ 
58 The impact on the movement was not limited to the register of ideological political
discourse;  it  also  gave  rise  to  an  organizational  change  in  which  women  were
encouraged to form their own independent political and military units without male
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commanders in order to fulfill  their duties to ‘fight for and liberate the homeland.’
Although  military  service  is  an  activity  associated  with  manhood,  the  movement’s
ideological  attitude did not allow this situation to impede women’s participation in
armed units. Yuval-Davis (2003: 189-190) states that even if military service is generally
associated with men, a strong ideological stance may help overcome some tensions,
especially in contexts where the national liberation army is less formal in terms of
hierarchy and organizational structure and when women’s liberation stands for the
liberation of the entire people. Öcalan’s evaluation below simultaneously illustrates the
tensions and takes an ideological stance against them:
It may be difficult, but women joining the army means taking the most radical step
to equality and freedom. If we can’t be as great as the situation demands, we will
finish ourselves off. Because no army has ever done so. If we do this, the radical
solution  will  follow.  That  is,  not  only  as  an  instrument  of  war,  not  even  for  a
liberation personality, but to achieve a living personality. (Öcalan 1999: 176)
59 Attempts in this respect gave rise to what in the movement is called ‘women army-
fication’ (ordulaşma). As can be seen in the quote below, this fact was associated with
the movement’s ideological framework of gender equality:
The  one  who  has  an  army  oppresses.  There  is  no  concept  such  as  an army  of
equality. Where there is equality, there are no armies. Armies appear where there is
inequality; one is the oppressor’s army, the other is the army of the oppressed. If,
somewhere, there are only men’s armies, this means that the reality of oppressed
women is in question. Life vindicates us.  As such  we should see and know that
women army-fication expresses a fundamental value for equality. (Esen 2002: 13)20
60 These  statements,  in  which  Öcalan  points  to  women  army-fication  as  fundamental
means of equality, was followed by the call to reorganize the relations between men
and women on the basis of equality. In the 1980s, Öcalan spoke to militant men about
how they should treat women, that is, he spoke with men about women; in the 1990s,
however,  he  spoke  with  women  militants  about  men,  and  drew  attention  to  the
significance of this: 
Man at hand was analyzed, and it was seen that man is the main problem. [...] For
me, the Man Question is now prior to the Woman Question. Does being  man equals
being in power? I ask men: If you have power, then why can’t you show this in the
most  elementary  problem of  war?  He  proves  his  manhood  by  domination  over
women, in sexual domination. This is a dominion of crude power; I found it foul,
and I shattered it. (Öcalan 1999: 30)
Don’t seek support in the magical hands of men. Stand on your feet, hang on to life
with your hands. (Öcalan 1999: 138)
We don’t  conduct  these  analyses  of  men for  nothing.  Especially  when it  is  the
Kurdish men in question, especially when this man is a member of the Party, these
analyses should be conducted in a reliable manner. Unless you analyze men, your
life is definitely in danger. You should analyze thoroughly, scientifically. You must
question. (Öcalan 1999: 82)
61 In these analyses,  Öcalan called on women to think about the ‘what  kind of  man?’
question. The ‘what kind of man?’ question can be interpreted as an inversion of the
‘what kind of woman?’ question, which was, as emphasized in the first part, raised from
the  late-19th  century  onwards,  almost  exclusively  by  pro-modernization,  reformist,
nationalist men:
The “what kind of man” question is a poignant one for you. The search for a man
who will not oppress you physically or emotionally is important. [...] you should be
prominent and contentious advocates of a right life. That is, you should take sides;
don’t  adjust  yourself  according  to  me  or  to  men;  adjust  yourself  according  to
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yourself. Be healthy, be free: Do whatever you need to do for self-determination as
a sex. (Öcalan 2000: 97, 120)
62 Nevertheless,  like in other similar  contexts,  women’s  position was not  independent
from the ideal ‘new society’ that the movement intended to establish. The movement
regarded and presented its own organizational structure and organizational relations
as a prototype of the ideal society that it wants to establish:
We want to build a new society. Let’s realize this new society, equality, freedom,
esteem, and love among ourselves first. (Öcalan 2000: 104-105) 
63 As mentioned before, the anti-colonial nationalist movements’ ideals of a ‘new society’
correspond more or less to the new society that the bourgeoisie wants to establish
along the lines of a new notion of discipline. Parallel to this we have seen that many
constructions  and  regulations  were  actualized  within  a  discourse  of  ‘women’s
liberation.’ What did the new society correspond to in our case, and how was it related
to women’s liberation? First of all, it must be stated that women’s equal participation in
the movement and right to self-determination were interpreted as signifiers of the new
society. There were intense debates on this topic within the Kurdish movement in the
period  between  1993  and  1996;  conferences  were  organized  and  organizational
experiments  carried  out.  As  a  result  of  such  efforts,  concepts  like  ‘women’s  social
contract’ and ‘women’s renaissance’ emerged alongside specific ideological texts like
‘women’s liberation ideology.’21
64 The concept of ‘women’s social contract,’ the development of which recalls Pateman’s
(1998) denouncement of contract theories as a contract among brothers, pointed towards
a new social organization in which women were subjects rather than objects. According
to the concept, women were advised to question their relations both with men and with
society, and to redefine these relations in a way that would make them equal (Serok
2001).22 In the discussion texts, published under the title Women’s Social Contract (Serok
2001:  5),  such  a  process  of  questioning  and  redefining  would  lead  to  a  ‘women’s
renaissance,’ and this would inverse the relationship of ‘slaves of slaves,’ paving the
way  for  the  enlightenment  of  the  entire  society.  The  principles  of  the  women’s
renaissance were defined in the women’s liberation ideology. Although it was defined
as women’s liberation ideology, in the context of women’s liberation, we should state
that the listed principles did not bind women only; they were binding for men as well,
setting forth firm conditions for them. In this sense,  it  can be stated that women’s
liberation ideology is the first text in which women set forth binding conditions for
men to abide by. When we consider that it is usually men who set the conditions for
women in  ethnic-national  processes,  it  is  remarkable  that  women here  set  binding
principles for men, even if these principles were limited to the movement’s own sphere
of  influence  and  to  its  own  organizational  structure.  On  the  other  hand,  both  for
women  and  men  the  aforementioned  principles  involved,  as  their  most  important
emphasis, the principle to ‘be faithful to the homeland and fight for it.’ The purpose of
this emphasis is obvious when we consider that these principles were determined in
the  context  of  an  ongoing  process  of  political  mobilization.  Another  principle  of
fundamental importance for our topic is that women were to be independent from men
and men were to avoid establishing patriarchal dominance over women. An important
step en route to realizing these principles was the establishment of a separate women’s
party in 1999 (Akkaya and Jongerden 2010).   
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3.3. The gender matrix of the new Kurdish identity
65 The discourse  of  the  Kurdish  movement  on  the  new society  can  also  be  read  as  a
discourse about the construction of Kurdish identity. We can argue in this context that
during  1990s,  this  discourse  was  shaped  not  only  by  the  aforementioned  desire  to
modernize, but also by the changing profile of actors during the process of political
mobilization in this decade. As can be remembered, the narrative of Kurdishness, which
was  determined  by  the  mobilization  strategy  of  1980s  and  by  the  movement’s
ideological structure,  was accompanied by dualisms like the ‘old (and pulled-down)’
versus ‘new,’ or ‘remnants of Medieval/traditional’ versus ‘modern’ and ‘free’; above
all, it was shaped around a critique of the patriarchal family, which was associated with
the ‘old,’ and around the critique of men’s and women’s roles within this family.
66 This  ‘new’  and modern Kurdishness  also  appeared as  a  narrative  about  the  family,
about  manhood  and  womanhood.  The  conditions  for  the  new  society  and  Kurdish
identity provided new codes to define the ‘new woman’ and the ‘new man’ in line with
the  political  aims  and  contemporary  mobilization  strategies  of  the  movement.  The
mediation that constituted the significatory framework was love, parallel to Sirman’s
(2002)  argument  that  the  nation-family  axis  becomes  the  milestone on which love,
affection and desires  are  curbed.  Öcalan’s  analyses  titled  Kurdish  Love,  published in
1999, highlighted that the new family (the big family or the new Kurdishness),  new
woman, and the new man will  be products of  a struggle for deserving love,  and of
success in this struggle. Success in this struggle was necessary for getting rid of the
curse of the ‘old’  and reaching the esteem promised by the ‘new woman’ and ‘new
man.’ The new woman, who would be the founder of the new society, was not just any
woman: 
When I  say  “woman must  be  trusted,”  I  refer  to  a  woman who has  owned her
identity, has become herself before anything else, has enlivened herself, has taught
others how to live with the proper power to govern and organize, the woman with
her valuable approaches; this is the free Woman I know. There is no need hold back
from this woman. Some regard such women dangerous. On the contrary, I adore
such women. (Öcalan 1999: 85-86)
67 The duties and responsibilities, and the promises of the new woman and new man were
briefly expressed as the ‘love-victory dialectics’:
Associate love with victory, victory with love. This is the dialectics of the Kurdish
resurrection, of the Kurdish liberation. (Öcalan 1999: 84)
Love is homeland. Love means freedom in the homeland, definite success in the
organization. Love is struggle. Love means victory in struggle. (Öcalan 1999: 180)
68 The analyses emphasized that the condition for love was freedom. What was meant by
freedom,  on  the  other  hand,  was  the  liberation  of  the  ‘homeland’  from  external
enemies  and  from the  ‘feudal  compradors,  who  are  remnants  of  the  Middle  Ages.’
Therefore, the condition for love was to substitute ‘love for the homeland’ for sexual
love: 
Love that doesn’t melt within the larger political organizational event constitutes a
problem. [...] to love on the right basis is a work of great justice, great beauty, great
effort and great victory. One who doesn’t provide these cannot love. Love without
carrying the organization forward, without improving all kinds of actions, without
a strong character is turpitude. [...] I am saying that love of those who are focused
on victory is valuable. Love has to be entirely focused on politics and on the march
to victory. (Öcalan 1999: 27)
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69 All  these  expressions  circulated widely  alongside the equation ‘who fights becomes
free, who is free becomes beautiful, who becomes beautiful is loved’ (Öcalan 1999: 28).
Consequently,  such  mediation  functioned  to  call  men  and  women  to  liberate  the
‘homeland’  in  order  to  deserve  to  be  loved,  and  this  mediation  made  possible  the
redefinition of ‘revolution’ as ‘revolution of love.’ Love remained an abstract target, an
ideal,  the  definite  condition  of  which  was  tightly  associated  with  ‘liberating  the
homeland.’ All love outside this ideal was, as defined in the quote above, a ‘problem.’
Therefore,  relations  of  love  and  affection  without  love  for  the  homeland  meant
transgressing  the  boundaries  of  subject  positions  provided  to  women,  and  the
transgression of the esteem provided by the positions of ‘new woman’ and ‘new man.’
At the same time, it pointed to the limits of the transformation in the notion of namus
allowing women to leave homes, bringing new forms of control over women stepping
out to the public sphere.
 
3.4. Invention of tradition
70 The discourse of becoming-goddess which developed after Zilan’s suicide action in 1995
assigned women the mission to constitute ‘new Kurdishness’ by referring to the cult of
the goddess. Besides calling women (and men) to self-sacrificial struggle, this discourse
was  also  functional  in  terms  of  the  PKK’s  change  of  strategy  in  1993.  Declaring  a
ceasefire in 1993, the PKK abandoned the thesis of a separate state, as well as other
objectives such as a national democratic revolution and alliance with the proletariat of
neighboring countries, objectives which were part of the first party program (İmset
1993). Besides the critique of ‘real socialism,’ political categories such as class, state,
and the dictatorship of the proletariat were abandoned, and were replaced by cultural
categories  like  ideology  and  morals;  the  progressive  notion  of  history was  also
criticized.23 The  space  opened  up  by  these  changes  in  the  ideological  register  was
beginning  to  be  filled  by  a  new discourse  built  with  new concepts  and  categories.
Parallel  to the abandonment of  the separate state thesis,  the thesis  of  ‘struggle for
freedom,  not  for  power’  was  put  forth,  a  thesis  which  can  be  interpreted  as  a
hegemonic struggle in civil society. Women were to be the subjects of this struggle.24
The risk  of  getting  stuck with  a  narrow nationalism as  a  result  of  abandoning the
classical Marxist framework was eliminated by prioritizing the discourses of ‘women’s
liberation’ and ‘women’s liberating mission.’ The ‘proletariat internationalism’ adopted
in the first program had now lost its actuality; and, the lack of universalism, a result of
abandoning  this  notion,  was  then  made  up  for  with  the  universalism  of  ‘women’s
liberation.’
71 During the process when the ideological framework was being redefined, the symbolic
role of women also underwent a transformation. The sources for this redefinition were
found in the ancient past when states first originated, in the symbiotic relationship
between  state  power  and  patriarchal  domination.  Accordingly,  women  had  more
reasons  than  men  for  struggling  against  patriarchy,  and  historically  had  greater
revolutionary  potential.25 Thus,  it  became  possible  to  construct  the  mythological
golden age of Kurds as a matrilineal rural society in the Neolithic age. It was discovered
that Kurds contributed to the development of ancient civilization within a matrilineal
social formation in which women were the main actors:
History starts with the Sumerians, but it is said that the Sumerian civilization was
actually nourished by the Mesopotamian civilization. Compared to the 500-year-
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long  capitalist  civilization  of  Europe,  this  is  a  much  more  rooted  history  of
civilization. All  of  the values and cultures of civilization spread out from Upper
Mesopotamia, and from the inner arch of the Taurus-Zagros system. [...] We possess
the fundamentals of humanity. (Öcalan 2001: 16, 18). 
What underlies sacredness is food. [...] What underlies food is mothers’ labor. She is
the creator, the inventor, and the nurturer. [...] she works solely on production; she
knows it; she sustains humanity through it. That is how she understands humanity.
The mother’s  humanity,  the  woman’s  humanity  means  this.  This  is  a  notion of
humanity that means sacred humanity. [...] The mother of these gods is the mother
goddess. (Öcalan 2001: 21)
[In Mesopotamia] the first celestial symbols do not have the shape of men, but of
women. Structures of femininity are dominant in the linguistic structure. This is
why the first  women goddesses,  symbolized by stars,  are  called  “sterk,”  that  is
stars: These are remnants of this era. (Öcalan 2001: 13)
72 The foundations for this ‘discovery’ was, as mentioned in the beginning of the paper,
created by referring to the connection between the Ishtar the Goddess and the Kurdish
word sterk, star:
When we came to Mesopotamia,  the lands,  which are the symbols  of  plenitude,
were the lands between the Euphrates and Tigris. [...] Production developed with
the unity of land and woman. In the history of humanity, Mesopotamia is the best-
known and proven example of the realization of primitive communal society. That
is,  it  is  revealed  that  this  society  was  shaped  between  the  rivers  Tigris  and
Euphrates. Animals were domesticated, seeded plants were cultivated, and women
did the majority of these jobs. Ishtar was the goddess of this culture. [...] For me,
Ishtar  is  Star.  In  fact,  Star in  Kurdish  is  Sterk.  Star means  star  in  the  European
languages. The origins of the word are Kurdish, from Mesopotamia. (Öcalan 1999:
134-135)
The greatest women originated from these lands, namely from Mesopotamia. We
are their followers. We are in an amorous movement going back in history. [...] The
goddess of love, the center for civilization is Mesopotamia. (Öcalan 1999: 189)
73 The only element missing in this construction was a symbol like the ‘Modern Kawa,’
which  could  be  associated  with  Ishtar,  completing  the  connection  between  the
Neolithic golden age and our present day. Zilan became nothing less than this symbol
after  her  suicide  action.  Parallel  to  Ishtar  being  one  of  the  pivotal  symbols  of  the
Neolithic revolution, Zilan was characterized as the ‘freedom goddess of the modern
age’  and the  founder  of  the  new society.  Zilan’s  action was  sublimated also  as  the
realization of the ‘love-victory’ dialectics:
Zilan is a love. ...  A realization of love. ... Living big, loving big. Fighting big. These
are tightly connected. If it becomes actualized, love will develop and be respected.
[...] our great politics is our great love. [...] It is a search for a definite life. It is an
enormous will to “freedom.” It is a reaction against life under the existing order.
[...] Her action is, at the same time, a great blow to the life in force. It is a blow to
the  classical  relationship  between  women  and  men.  Women-men,  marriage,
sexuality, love, emotions: it is a blow to all of these. (Öcalan 1999: 28, 97)
74 Zilan’s action, besides showing the necessary thresholds for the ‘new manhood,’ also
pointed to the conditions for women to be loved:
When Zilan’s identity was revealed, old manhood was entirely dead. (Öcalan 1999:
108)
[Zilan] also reveals very clearly how the beautiful woman will be actualized. (Öcalan
1999: 40)
75 On the other hand, it is clear in these kinds of analyses that the real-life consequences
of the constitutive mission symbolically given to women is to become goddesses;  in
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other words, to follow Zilan’s path and undertake sacrificial acts to the degree of giving
up  life.  Assigning  a  constitutive  role  to  women  was  strictly  predicated  upon  the
successful realization of expected duties and victories.
Everything’s realization depends on this victory; great action will generate great
life. (Öcalan 1999: 108)
 
4. Natural Contradictions of the Identity Discourse:
Limits and Possibilities
76 The  first  part  of  this  article  discussed  contradictions  in  national  fictions  from  the
perspective of women. If we look at these contradictions more closely, we see at the
one hand that women are assigned a constituting mission and at the other hand that
women are asked to become goddesses, and that new (and respected) boundaries of
female identity are closely associated with the refusal of any other love than the love of
the homeland.  The contradiction here is not identical to the contradiction of bourgeois
reform programs that was defined in the first part of the paper. The reason for this is
that the contradiction does not belong to a bourgeois class in search of new power, but
is  related  to  the  left-wing  ideological  attitudes  and  the  mobilizing  strategy  of  a
movement, defining itself on the bases of equality of ethnic identity and demands for
freedom.
77 On the other hand, it must be noted that the contradiction is not limited to this. The
characterization  of  Kurds  as  a  ‘womanized  people,’  which  one  encounters  in  the
analyses and other ideological texts of the movement, can also be seen as one of the
paradoxes of the discourse of Kurdish identity, a discourse which constitutes women as
active  subjects.  The  critique  of  the  ‘old  man’  was  aimed  at  the  man’s  position  of
patriarchal despot in the family. In an interview, Öcalan talked about the necessity of
killing this form of manhood:
Killing  the man is,  actually,  the  fundamental  principle  of  socialism.  It  is  to  kill
power, to kill one-sided domination. (Quoted in Sayın 1998: 61)
78 ‘Killing the man’ could, at first sight, be evaluated as radical discourse aimed at the
dissolution of patriarchy. However, on closer examination it is possible to see that the
same discourse has the potential to reproduce gender hierarchies. For the man to be
killed  was  defined  as  a  ‘false’  man,  a  manhood  which,  it  was  claimed,  actually
‘womanized’ man:
In  fact,  womanhood  is  not  merely  a  sexual  concept.  Historically  we  see  that  a
woman,  when  torn  apart  from  social,  political,  and  especially  military  fields,
becomes a wife. That is, womanhood is actually the product of social and political
development.  [...]  The  Kurdish  man,  just  as  he  is  withheld  from  political  and
military  development,  is  also  the  servant  and  comprador  for  others.  In  fact,  a
woman is a comprador for man, too. But man is a comprador for another sovereign
nation, a comprador of a sovereign class, much worse than the woman is.  (Esen
2002: 10-1126)
79 The characterizations above involve different  meanings and implications.  In  a  way,
similar to Fanon’s (1965) call for colonized men to reclaim their manhood, they could
be interpreted as an implied call for men to reclaim their manhood in war. As Cynthia
Enloe  also  emphasizes,  these  types  of  perspectives  have  not  only  legitimized  the
extremely macho styles of many anti-colonial and black power movements; they have
also legitimized the secondary status of women within national communities. Even if
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the critique of ‘false manhood’ impeded the legitimization of a similar macho style, it
cannot be overlooked that it summons men to achieve ‘real power’ in place of their
false power over women. Thus, Öcalan, in the same interview quoted above, states:
I’m asking the men: do you want to be a man? If you want to be a real man, I have
some conditions for you. You shall not boast in front of miserable wives. (Quoted in
Sayın 1998: 366-367) 
80 It  is  as  if  men kept  their  place  in  the  gender  hierarchy,  while  only  the  conditions
changed:
Would we have come to this situation if men were real men? [...] We see so much
bullying, but the same man is much worse than a woman when it comes to the
fundamental values. Is his bullying of any value? (Öcalan 2000: 144-145)
81 Öcalan’s autobiography, which he developed as a method of sociological and political
analysis,  is  structured  upon  a  narrative  of  ‘reaching  victory  by  giving  up  false
manhood.’  As  in  the example below,  in  many of  his  evaluations,  one observes  that
‘giving up false manhood’ is defined as the way to rescue real manhood:
Now, there are two types of Kurds: First, those who have lost their valor [...]. These
are castrated Kurds, and they are many in numbers. Stay away from the castrated
Kurds, and try to identify who they are. Then there are those who are loyal to the
land, to their country, to their people. [...] This is why I renounced manhood. Why,
because they wanted to castrate me. I told them that I resigned from my manhood.
(Öcalan 1999: 186-187)
82 The statement ‘I avoided being castrated by resigning from manhood’ implies a success
in being a real man. Therefore, even if this language criticizes being ‘macho,’ one can
say that it is still a gendered language.
83 Finally, one needs to specify to whom this language belongs. As indicated above, this
language  belongs  to  Öcalan.  It  is  a  language  which  has  been  defining,  classifying,
inviting and excluding from 1978, when the PKK was founded, to 1999. How to evaluate
the fact that it is a male leader who invites women to participate, to become liberated,
to answer the question ‘what kind of man,’ and to take on the role of constituting the
new society and the new Kurdish identity? First  of  all,  one needs to state that  the
position  of  the  inviter  does  not  transform  him  into  a  ‘nation-founding  patriarchal
father’ figure, contrary to the examples in similar contexts. The ideological discourse of
the  movement  harbors  an  imagination  of  a  community  of  equal  citizens  —  an
expression of the egalitarian and pro-modernization desires — rather than a founding
father figure. Yet, the leader still enjoys a unique place in relation to the ‘community of
equal citizens.’ Terms such as ‘Party Leadership’ or the ‘Presidency,’ which Öcalan uses
in reference to himself, and which is unquestionably accepted by the militants, help
construct  him  as  an  institution  beyond  his  being  as  a  person.  This  has  certain
consequences with regard to gender relations. The discourse that constructs Öcalan as
an institution rather than a person harbors androgynous qualities, placing the ‘Party
Leadership’  at  an equal  distance to  both men and women;  more precisely,  it  has  a
transcendental position with regards to both. Thus, the main themes of the founding
narrative of  the leader  consist  of  ‘killing the man’  and ‘overcoming the traditional
woman who pulls down.’ Both men and women within the given society are already
defeated in relation to this institution.
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Conclusion
84 This article has analyzed the ideological discourse of  the Kurdish movement in the
1980s  and  1990s  and  the  construction  of  Kurdish  identity  in  the  light  of  feminist
studies,  which  show  that  ethnic  national  fictions  and  projects  and  constructed  in
gendered ways.
85 Although the Kurdish movement later renounced the goal of founding a separate state,
the movement after 1980 had features in common with the late-19th and early  20th-
century  pro-modernization,  anti-colonial  national  movements  in  terms  both  of  its
Kurdish identity-based political aims and its mobilizing strategy. We see, for example, a
struggle against local ‘feudal’ compradors — defined as ‘remnants of the Middle Ages’ —
as  a  necessary  part  of  the  struggle  against  the  ‘colonizer.’  Similarly,  ‘women’s
liberation’ is placed at the heart of modernization.
86 On the other hand, one observes differences as well. In early 20th -century anti-colonial
movements,  the burden to  represent  the new and modern society  was  imposed on
women as a precondition for taking part in the public sphere. Yet, women were also
assigned the duty to protect the authentic ‘essence’ of national culture, to transmit this
culture to new generations, and to act as boundary markers. In the Kurdish movement,
however,  one  does  not  observe  similar  contradictions  arising  from  this  dual
signification.  Within  the  ideological  discourse  of  the  Kurdish  movement,  Kurdish
women do not come to the fore as carriers and transmitters of the authentic essence of
Kurdish culture. On the contrary, they are invited to leave their homes and become
active participants. In this sense, they are not ‘wives and children’ to be protected by
the male members of the nation, unlike in Enloe’s (2006) analysis. They are invited to
work alongside men to protect the homeland and construct the new society. Therefore,
the problems concerning women’s citizenship mentioned in the first part of the paper
are not reproduced in the Kurdish context. On the contrary, at least on the ideological-
political discursive register, women’s active citizenship is emphasized using concepts
such  as  ‘women’s  social  contract.’  Thus,  we  can  argue  that  women  have  become
participants in the masculine discourse of nation building — keeping in mind that they
were primarily invited by the leader — and that this was possible due to the left-wing
ideological-political  framework  of  the  movement,  to  the  mobilization  strategies
requiring women’s participation, and to the women’s participation itself.
87 Like many other national narratives of identity, the narrative of Kurdish identity is also
a narrative about family,  womanhood, manhood, and thus about love and affection.
However, there is a differentiation from national fictions based on the analogy between
family and nation. While defining the patriarchal family and values as ‘the other’ of
new Kurdishness,  the critique of  the old family and the old man prevents the new
Kurdishness from being imagined as an extended patriarchal family; also, since the new
identity  is  not  defined  in  relation  to  an  ethnic/national  other,  it  can  be  more
permeable. While on the practical level the critique of the patriarchal value system
liberates  women  from  the  familial  control  by  men,  on  the  level  of  ideological
construction, it enables women to become equal subjects.
88 However,  from  a  gender  perspective,  the  discursive  transformation  still  involves
contradictions. For example, the passage towards becoming constitutive subjects is not
open to all women, but only to women who satisfy certain requirements. Women are
asked to desexualize themselves when entering the public sphere much as they are in
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other anti-colonial pro-modernization national movements. Respectable participation
in  the  public  sphere  is  strictly  predicated  upon  an  amorous  attachment  to  the
homeland, and to fighting for it. Substituting sexual love for the love for the homeland
is enough reason to be excluded from the ‘liberated’ and ‘trustworthy’ female identity
and being  labeled  as  ‘woman who pulls  down.’  Therefore,  the  same discourse  that
enables women to leave their homes by overcoming the namus barrier also establishes a
new patriarchal control in the public sphere. In Walby’s (1992) words, a shift happens
from the private form of patriarchy to its public form.
89 In conclusion, it can be said that we are facing a discourse of national identity which
has multiple surfaces and meanings, and which is being continuously constructed. This
field of multiple meanings and contradictions could possibly lead to positive results, as
Kandiyoti also states in her examination, as a consequence of active struggle by the
actors. Although the Kurdish movement’s ideological discourse harbors many of the
contradictions that are generally found in ethnic-national narratives and discourses, it
has  created  the  possibility  for  women  to  engage  in  struggle  against  these
contradictions  by  enabling  them  to  leave  their  homes.  It  is  only  women’s  active
struggle that can determine which meanings will be fixed and which meanings will not.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abu-Lughod, Lila (ed.) (1998), Remaking Women, Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East.
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Açık, Necla (2002) ‘Ulusal Mücadele, Kadın Mitosu ve Kadınların Harekete Geçirilmesi:
Türkiye’deki Çağdaş Kürt Kadın Dergilerinin Bir Analizi.’ In: Aksu Bora and Asena Günal (eds), 
90’larda Türkiye’de Feminizm Türkiye’de Feminizm. Istanbul: İletişim.
Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi and Joost Jongerden (2010), ‘2000’lerde PKK: Kırılmalara Rağmen
Süreklilik,’ Toplum ve Kuram 4, pp.79–101.
Aksoy, Gürdal (1998), Bir Tarih Bir Söylence. Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın.
Anderson, Benedict (1991), Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Barth, Fredrik (2001) Kürdistan’da Toplumsal Örgütlenmenin İlkeleri, Istanbul: Avesta.
Beşikçi, İsmail (1992 [1967]) Doğu Mitinglerinin Analizi. Ankara: Yurt Yayınları.
Bozarslan, Hamit (2002) ‘Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketleri.’ In: Tanıl Bora (ed.), Modern
Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, vol.4: Milliyetçilik. Istanbul: İletişim.
Van Bruinessen, Martin (1992a) Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar (trans. Nevzat Kıraç et al.). Istanbul:
İletişim.
Van Bruinessen (1992b) Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan.
London: Zed Books.
Casier, Marlies and Joost Jongerden (eds) (2011) Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey, Political Islam,
Kemalism and Kurdish Issue, London / New York: Routledge.
From Kawa the Blacksmith to Ishtar the Goddess: Gender Constructions in Ideol...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14 | 2012
23
Cemal, Hasan (2003) Kürtler. Istanbul: Doğan Kitap. 
Chatterjee, Partha (1993) The Nation and its Fragments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Chatterjee, Partha (2000) ‘Kadın Sorununa Milliyetçi Çözüm.’ In: Ayşegül Altınay (ed.), Vatan,
Millet, Kadınlar. Istanbul: İletişim.
Chatterjee, Partha (2002) Ulus ve Parçaları. Istanbul: İletişim.
Çağlayan, Handan (2007) Analar, Yoldaşlar, Tanrıçalar: Kürt Hareketinde Kadınlar ve Kadın Kimliğinin
İnşası. Istanbul: İletişim.
Çağlayan, Handan (2011) ‘Bir Kota Örneği Olarak Demokratik Toplum Partisinde %40 Kadın
Kotası,’ B. Ünlü and O. Değer (eds.) İsmail Beşikçi Kitabı, Istanbul, İletişim. 
Demirer, Y. (2005), ‘Rite of passage as a communal classroom : the pedagogical recycling of
traditional New Year celebrations in Turkey.’ In E. Thomas Ewing (ed.), Revolution and Pedagogy:
Interdiciplinary and Transnational Perspectives on Educational Foundations. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Ecevitoğlu, Pınar (2012) Namus, Töre ve İktidar. Ankara: Dipnot.
Ekinci, Tarık Ziya (2001) ‘Türkiye İşçi Partisive Kürt Aydınlanma Hareketi.’ İkinci Bilim ve Siyaset 1,
pp.76-118.
Enloe, Cynthia H. (2000) Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Enloe, Cynthia H. (2003) Muzlar, Plajlar, Askeri Üsler, Feminist Bakış Açısından Uluslararası Siyaset
(trans. Berna Kurt and Ece Aydın). Istanbul: Çitlembik. 
Enloe, Cynthia H. (2006) Manevralar(trans. Serpil Çağlayan). Istanbul: İletişim. 
Esen, Nesrin (2002), Özgür Yaşamla Diyaloglar. Istanbul: Çetin Yayınları.
Fanon, Frantz (1965) The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.
Gellner, Ernst (1998) Milliyetçiliğe Bakmak (trans. Simten Coşar et al.). Istanbul: İletişim.
Hassanpour, Amir (2001) ‘The (Re)Production of Patriarchy in the Kurdish Language.’ In:
Shahrzad Mojab (ed.), Women of a Non-State Nation: The Kurds. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda.
Hobsbawm, Eric (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
İmset, İsmet G. (1993) PKK, Ayrılıkçı Şiddetin 20 Yılı (1973-1992). Ankara: TDN.
Jayawardena, Kumari (1986) Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books.
Jwaideh, Wadie (2006) The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development. Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press. 
Kandiyoti, Deniz (1987) ‘Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case.’ Feminist
Studies 13, pp.317-338.
Kandiyoti, Deniz (1997) Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar, Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler. Istanbul:
Metis. 
Kirişçi, Kemal and Gareth M. Winrow (1997) The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-
state Ethnic Conflict. Istanbul: Frank Cass Publishers. 
From Kawa the Blacksmith to Ishtar the Goddess: Gender Constructions in Ideol...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14 | 2012
24
Klein, Janet (2001) ‘En-gendering Nationalism: The Women Question in Kurdish Nationalist
 Discourse of the Late Ottoman Period.’ In: Shahrzad Mojab (ed.), Women of Non-State Nation: The
Kurds. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda.
Kürkçü, Ertuğrul and Ragıp Duran (1995) Diriliş Tamamlandı Sıra Kurtuluşta. Istanbul: Güneş Ülkesi
Yayıncılık.
McDowall, David (1997) A Modern History of the Kurds. London / NewYork: I.B Tauris.
Moghadam, Valentine M. (1994) ‘Reform, Revolution, and Reaction: the Trajectory of the
“Woman Question” in Afganistan.’ In: V. Moghadam (ed.), Gender and National Identity. London:
Zed Books.
Najmabadi, Afsaneh (1997) ‘The Erotic Vatan (Homeland) as Beloved and Mother: To Love,  To
Posses, and the Protect.’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 39 (4), pp. 442-467. 
Najmabadi, Asfaneh (2000) ‘Sevgili ve Ana Olarak Erotik Vatan: Sevmek, Sahiplenmek, Korumak.’
In: Ayşegül Altınay (ed.), Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar. Istanbul: İletişim. 
Olson, Robert (1989) The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925.
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Öcalan, Abdullah (1992a), Kadın ve Aile Sorunu (ed. S. Erdem). Istanbul: Melsa Yayınları.
Öcalan, Abdullah (1992b), 12 Eylül Faşizmive PKK Direnişi. Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın.
Öcalan, Abdullah (1995), Politik Rapor (5. Kongre). Istanbul: Güneş Ülkesi Yayıncılık.
Öcalan, Abdullah (1999), Kürt Aşkı. Istanbul: Aram.
Öcalan, Abdullah (2000); Nasıl Yaşamalı I. Cilt. Istanbul: Mem Yayınları.
Öcalan, Abdullah (2001), Kutsallığın ve Lanetin Şehri. Istanbul: Mem yayınları.
Öcalan, Abdullah (2004), Bir Halkı Savunmak. Istanbul: Çetin Yayınları.
Özcan, Nihat Ali (1999) PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, İdeolojisi, Yöntemi. Ankara: ASAM.
Özgür Kadın Birliği YAJK (1998) ‘II. Ortadoğu Konferans Belgeleri.’ Yaşamda Özgür Kadın Dergisi 6.
Pateman, Carole (1988) The Sexual Contract. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Sayın, Mahir (1998) Erkeği Öldürmek. Istanbul: Zelal Yayınları.
Serok, Melsa (2001) Kadının Toplumsal Sözleşmesi. Istanbul: Hevi Yayınları.
Sirman, Nükhet (2002) ‘Kadınların Milliyeti.’ In: Tanıl Bora (ed.), Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce,
vol.4: Milliyetçilik. Istanbul: İletişim. 
Sirman, Nükhet (2006) ‘Akrabalık, Siyaset ve Sevgi: Sömürge-Sonrası Koşullarda Namus- Türkiye
Örneği.’ In: Shahrzad Mojab and Nahla Abdo (eds), Namus Adına Şiddet: Kuramsal ve Siyasal Yaklaşı
mlar. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
Stephen, Lynn (2005) ‘Gender, Citizenship, and the Politics of Identity.’ In: June Nash (ed.), Social
Movements: An Anthropological Reader, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Tillion, Germaine (1983) Republic of Cousins. London: Saqi Books. 
Walby, Sylvia (1992) Theorizing Patriarchy. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Walby, Sylvia (2000), ‘Kadın ve Ulus.’ In: Ayşegül Altınay (ed.), Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar. Istanbul:
İletişim.
From Kawa the Blacksmith to Ishtar the Goddess: Gender Constructions in Ideol...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14 | 2012
25
Yalçın-Heckman, Lale (2002) Kürtlerde Aşiret ve Akrabalık İlişkileri. Istanbul: İletişim.
Yalçın-Heckman, Lale and Pauline van Gelder (2000) ‘90’larda Türkiye’de Siyasal Söylemin
Dönüşümü Çerçevesinde Kürt Kadınların İmajı: Bazı Eleştirel Değerlendirmeler.’ In: Ayşegül
Altınay (ed.), Vatan, Millet, Kadınlar. Istanbul: İletişim.
Yuval-Davis, Nira (1997) Gender and Nation. London / New Delhi: Sage.
Yuval-Davis, Nira (2003) Cinsiyet ve Millet, Istanbul: İletişim.
Yuval-Davis, Nira and Floya Anthias (eds) (1989) Women-Nation-State. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Yüksel, Metin (2006) ‘The Encounter of Kurdish Women with Nationalism in Turkey.’ Middle
Eastern Studies 42 (5), pp.777-802.
NOTES
1. For  the  emergence  of  the  Kurdish  movement  in  Post-1980  Turkey  and  Turkey’s  ‘Kurdish
Question’ see Kirişçi and Minrov 1997, İmset, 1993, and Casier and Jongerden 2010.
2. For a successful study of the Kurdish women’s dynamism in the context of black feminism, see
MetinYüksel 2006.
3. Moghadham (1994: 85) borrows the term patriarchal belt from demographer J. Caldwell, a term
which denotes the geography starting from North Africa and the Middle East extending to the
rural India and China, and uses the term to refer to classical patriarchy. The patriarchal family in
this geography is the main social unit, and the oldest men have rights over all the other family
members. The main characteristic of the social structures under the patriarchal belt is the strict
control over women’s behavior. In question is a strong ideology which relates the honor of the
family to women’s chastity.
4. For gender relations among Kurds, see Yalçın-Heckman 2002, Hasanpour, 2001, Barth, 2001,
and Bruinessen, 1992a.
5. For the origins of the concept namus (honour), and the evolution of the surveillance of women’s
sexuality and behaviors, see G. Tillilon 1983. Nükhet Sirman (2006: 48–49) states that namus is
used both by men and women in contemporary Turkey, but that there are matters of gender
discrimination  between  women’s  namus and  men’s  namus.  For  a  man,  namus indicates  the
condition of  being trustworthy and establishing control  over both his own sexuality and the
sexualities of the women under his responsibility; however, for a woman, namus is about her own
sexuality. 
6. Called Newroz, Nevruz, or Nuroz, the festival, which is celebrated on the 21st of March across a
large geography extending from the Middle East to Asia, celebrates the coming of spring and the
coming to life of nature, has gained meanings for Kurds that go well beyond the cultural. The
form of Newroz, which is associated with the myth of the Kawa the Blacksmith, has become an
important element in the construction of  Kurdishness as  a  political  identity since the 1960s.
According to the myth of the Kawa the Blacksmith, which is defined by Hamit Bozarslan (2002) as
the founding myth of Kurdishness, Medes are acknowledged as the ancestors of Kurds, who were
enslaved by the Assyrian emperor Dehak. Escaping to the mountains and breaking away from
Dehak, Kurdish youth rebelled against the emperor under the leadership of Kawa the Blacksmith.
On March 21st, they set up bonfires up on the mountains as a symbol of their rebellion against the
empire, and of their claims to freedom (Aksoy 1998). Resignification of Newroz by the Kurdish
political elite since 1960s made possible the constitution of the Kurdish identity in continuity
with the ancient peoples of the Mesopotamia—the Medes—and also provided an important space
for the expression of the Kurds’ present political demands (Demirer, 2005).
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7. Ishtar, who is believed to be derived from the Sumerian goddess of fertility Inanna, and who
has its roots in the northwestern Semitic goddess Astarte, corresponds in many languages to
words denoting stars (star/stern/sterk). In Kurdish star/sterk means both ‘star’ and a place for
shelter.
8. Although most of these sources were published with Öcalan’s name as the author, some were
published under other pen names. In this article, Öcalan’s interviews are also referred to.
9. For an oral history study on the women’s perceptions and experiences, see Çağlayan 2007.
10. An edited book involving analyses with similar critiques was published later with the title
Kurdish Love (Öcalan 1999). In this part of the article, we refer to Kurdish Love only for purposes
concerning the movement’s discourse about the family, since the book involves other subjects
and belongs to the 1990s.
11. In the Woman and Family Question women are for the most part referred to as ‘pulled-down.’
‘Being pulled-down’ refers to degradation, being dishonorable, being deprived of social, political,
economic opportunities and sources, having no choice other than being a wife to a man, being
reduced to a sexual object and an instrument of production, and having one’s will disregarded.
‘Woman pulling a man down’ means a woman—who is thus weakened and deprived of will—using
her sexuality to bind a man to herself and to family. It is implied that if a man is bound to a
woman  and  to  a  family,  this  will  prevent  him  from  fulfilling  his  social  and  political
responsibilities, and he will be deprived of his will, socially and politically, just like the women
are.  (‘Pulled-down’  (düşürülmüş)  is  derived  from  the  Turkish  verb  düşmek,  to  fall.  One  can
compare the term to English fallen when it used passively (pulled-down); yet,  in the Turkish
original, the verb is also used actively, as in to pull someone down, similar to its figurative use in
English, denoting negative moral/emotional influence over some other person.)
12. In Kurdish, serhildan means rebellion. 
13. On state violence in this period, see Cemal 2003.
14.   In 1992, Turkish security forces carried out an armed operation in Northern Iraq, in which
PKK forces were located. Iraqi Kurdish armed groups, Talabani’s and Barzani’s pesmerges, were
involved in the Turkish army’s operation. PKK forces remained between them and a lot of PKK
members lost their lives during the conflicts. During this military operation, called the ‘South
War’ in PKK sources, women participated extensively on the frontline. They resisted until the
operation ended, and their resistance made them more respected among the movement’s armed
units. Even those who asserted that women should not participate in the armed conflicts changed
their  mind.  The  woman warrior  named Beritan,  who  preferred  to  commit  suicide  instead  of
surrendering, was especially influential. Öcalan mentioned her name often in his analyses.
15. For the source involving such evaluations, see Öcalan 1992b.
16. For women’s activities in political parties, see Çağlayan 2011.
17. Until he was arrested and brought back to Turkey in 1999 the addressor remained Öcalan.
18. An  interesting  comparison  can  be  made  here.  As  will  be  remembered,  Najmabadi’s
evaluations  were  presented  in  the  first  part,  arguing  that  in  the  case  of  Iran,  love  for  the
homeland  was  constituted  as  an  erotic  heterosexual  love  for  men.  When  women  started
participating in the movement, the fiction changed, and homeland became a mother, and the
women involved in the struggle were imagined as the daughters of the nation taking care of their
elder mother (Najmabadi 2000: 148). In the case of the Kurdish movement, although there are
examples where the ‘homeland’ is associated with a mother in pain, in the Kurdish movement’s
ideological  texts one doesn’t  encounter the identification of  the homeland with the mother/
woman. In fact, as was partly mentioned above and as will be explained below, what lies at the
heart of this discourse is ‘freedom,’ and liberating/freeing the homeland is a duty that is assigned
both  to  men  and  women.  Therefore,  in  the  ideological  register,  it  is  hard  to  say  that  the
homeland is  a  gendered concept.  Consequently,  the ‘duty to fight for the homeland’  has not
produced differences between men and women.
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19. See footnote 14.
20. These are Öcalan’s words. Esen is one of his pseudonyms. 
21.  For the term of women’s liberation ideology and its principals,  see,  Yaşamda Özgür Kadın
Dergisi, 1998, issue 6. For an analysis of Kurdish women’s magazines, including this one, see N.
Açık, 2002.
22.  The author for this source is said to be Melsa Serok, which is another nom de guerre. The
source consists of anonymous texts which came out as results of discussions among women and
of the conferences, plus Öcalan’s evaluations.
23. One of the texts in which the aforementioned changes are most obvious is the 5 th Congress
Report  in  1995.  This  report,  which was  read  by  the  author  before,  was  out  of  reach due  to
prohibitions. In fact, a similar problem is pertinent for most of the referred sources.
24. For the contents of the summarized ideological transformation, see Öcalan 2004.
25. For the long and detailed texts that are subject to evaluation, see Öcalan 2001, Öcalan 1999,
Öcalan 2004.
26. As indicated above, Esen is a pen-name. Although the book involves Öcalan’s analyses, the
quoted text is an anonymous text by the women of the PKK. 
ABSTRACTS
The  Kurdish  movement  in  post-1980  Turkey  successfully  mobilized  Kurdish  women.  Themes
related to gender equality have gained importance especially in late 1990s, when Kurdish women
started to participate actively in the Kurdish movement. In the same period, the mythological
sources  of  Kurdishness  as  a  political  identity  were  changed.  Building  on   feminist  studies
exposing the interaction between ethnic/nationalist processes and gender relations, this article
aims to examine the Kurdish movement’s ideological discourse from a gender perspective. By
analyzing Öcalan’s writings during the 1978-1999 period, the article argues that there is a mutual
interaction  between  the  Kurdish  movement’s  ideological  political  and  women’s  agency  in
political  participation.  The paper  shows that  the left-wing and secular  characteristics  of  the
Kurdish  movement  facilitated  women’s  participation  in  the  movement  and  that  women’s
participation affected both the importance of gender equality within the ideological and political
discourse of the Kurdish movement and within its organizational structure. The paper concludes
by pointing out the limits and contradictions of the movement’s discourse on gender equality. 
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